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the larger are the backward linkage effects. They reach their maximum under perfect 
competition in the intermediate goods market, minimum – under monopoly in this sector, and 
medium size - when a vertically integrated local firm exists in the market. We have also 
discovered that a more competitive market structure per se doesn’t guarantee larger positive 
effects of FDI. It is important that in addition to a competitive structure local firms do not 
significantly lag behind foreign firms in their technological level.  
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1. Introduction 
Governments of many countries consider the attraction of foreign direct 
investment (hereinafter – FDI) as their priority task. It is believed that by investing 
companies not only contribute to GDP growth in the host country, but also provide up-
to-date technologies of production and management, therefore increasing efficiency of 
the economy as a whole. Moreover, increases in competition owing to multinational 
corporations can lead to the reduction of prices, which increases the welfare of domestic 
consumers. 
Traditionally we distinguish between direct and external FDI effects. Direct 
effects include influences on the volume of production and export in the host economy, 
real wages, prices of final goods, and the amount of taxes accruing to the state budget, 
resulting from change in the production volume at these firms with foreign 
participation. Another group of effects – external effects – are connected to the 
influence of FDI on the domestic firms in the host economy, and includes market effects 
(pro-competitive effects, crowding-out effect), diffusion effects (effects of transferring 
“process”, and “product” technology, management and marketing resources). 
Furthermore, external effects can be divided into horizontal and vertical effects 
depending on the market in which FDI exerts influence on the domestic sector of the 
economy: either within the product market where foreign companies operate (horizontal 
spillover effects) or in a number of sectors interconnected by a vertical technological 
chain (vertical effects or linkage effects). 
Linkage effects are intersectorial effects in a “supplier-consumer” chain 
(“intermediate goods – final goods”); they emerge in one of the sectors in response to 
the changes in the other when there is a vertical interconnection between them. 
According to the direction of influence linkage effects are divided into: backward 
linkages – from consumer to supplier; forward linkages – from supplier to consumer; 
feedback effects – effects that originate in response to the original effects of an opposite 
sign. 
In recent years a lot of researchers have come to a conclusion that linkage effects 
are the main way of positive influence of FDI on the host economy. This conclusion is 
particularly important for developing and transitional economies. It is based mainly on   3
the results of empirical research of the FDI conducted using databases on relatively 
large group of countries from the 1990s to the beginning of the 21
st century 
(Goerg/Strobl, 2001; Goerg/Greenaway, 2002). 
Whereas until the middle of the 1990s the majority of empirical papers had been 
devoted to showing proof of positive horizontal FDI spillover effects both in developed 
and developing economies, more recent research  usually shows the use of more correct 
econometric methods and panel databases demonstrating that horizontal effects have a 
negative sign or are statistically insignificant.  
Negative horizontal spillover effects revealed themselves particularly 
pronounced when assessing FDI influence on the domestic sector in transitional 
economies of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Goerg/Greenaway, 2002). 
Existence of negative intersectorial FDI spillover effects in the CEE transitional 
economies can be explained by at least three conditions (Kadochnikov, 2005). First, the 
domestic firms’ level of technology in these economies remains insufficient for 
effective diffusion of the up-to-date technology that the firms with FDI possess. Under 
these circumstances negative crowding-out effects prevail and exceed possible positive 
effects of new technology’s diffusion. Second, it is very likely that foreign companies 
use the most qualified labor, drawing specialists from domestic firms, and thus 
decreasing efficacy of these firms. Third, under conditions of relatively limited time 
horizons of the available databases on the transitional economies, possible positive 
influence of foreign firms on the efficacy of domestic firms remains either not revealed 
yet or difficult to recognize (Djankov/Hoekman, 1999, p. 19). 
On the contrary, empirical verification of FDI linkage effects revealed that in 
most cases they are positive and statistically significant (Georg/Strobl, 2002; 
Smarzynska, 2004; Schoors/van der Tol, 2001). This result can be explained by the 
following factors. First, when analyzing vertical effects researchers take into 
consideration the influence of firms with FDI on domestic firms only in other markets. 
Intersectorial interaction cannot be accompanied by traditional negative crowding-out 
effects, since there is no competition for a bigger market share between the considered 
economic agents. Second, multinational corporations are interested in the technological 
development of their buyers and suppliers, so they promote (in every way) the transfer   4
of their up-to-date technologies. Market success of foreign companies essentially 
depends on the level of technology and quality of production of their partners. 
This paper is devoted to the two factors that influence the size of linkage effects 
– market structure and technological gap. Market structure is supposed to be a very 
important parameter of intersectorial interaction between foreign and domestic sectors 
of the economy, as it considerably affects volumes of demand and supply of 
intermediate goods and thus broadens or narrows the channels for the FDI linkage 
effects. Technological gap between the foreign and domestic firms reflects the 
absorptive capacity of the native firms to obtain the foreign advanced technology and 
thus influences FDI effects. 
By now there exists a relatively small number of theoretical papers devoted to 
the modeling of intersectorial FDI linkage effects and to the analysis of factors 
influencing the sign and size of these effects in particular. 
One of the first theoretical works in this sphere was the paper of Rodriguez-
Clare (1996), where it is argued that the coming of multinational corporations leads to 
the increase of demand for intermediate goods in the local market, which consequently 
results in the rise of diversity of intermediate goods produced in the country. Increase in 
the variety of intermediate goods has a positive effect on the local final goods producers 
by favoring growth of labour productivity in this sector. The size of positive FDI 
linkage effects is affected positively: first, by the intensity of intermediate goods usage 
in the production by companies with FDI; second, by the size of communication costs 
between multinational corporation’s headquarters and their subsidiary units; third, by 
the difference in the variety of intermediate goods produced in the host economy and in 
the donor country. 
The Markusen/Venables (1999) model represents dynamic interaction between 
multinational corporations and local firms. The coming of multinationals to the sector 
causes a negative competitive effect, which leads to crowding-out of some local 
companies. At the same time a positive backward linkage effect arises, which results in 
the development of local suppliers. Under an assumption of increasing returns to scale, 
development of suppliers leads to positive forward linkage effect in the sector with 
multinational corporations and to the development of local firms in the final goods 
sector. Gradually local companies become more effective in comparison with   5
multinationals and crowd them out. In that way, expansion of multinational corporations 
is a catalyst for industrial development of the host economy on the whole. 
Matouschek/Venables (2005) in their research on intersectorial FDI effects in 
varied goods markets, mark out the following factors affecting these effects: degree to 
which investors are aimed at foreign markets; degree to which they are aimed at 
domestic suppliers of intermediate goods; openness of the economy receiving the 
investment; competitiveness of intermediate and final goods markets. As for the latter, 
the authors have come to a conclusion that the more imperfect the competition in the 
intermediate goods market is, the stronger are the positive FDI feedback linkage effects. 
Lin/Saggi (2003)
 in their work model demonstrated FDI linkage effects in the 
case when the market structure of the final goods sector (FDI importing sector) is 
represented by a local monopoly (case without foreign company) or Cournot oligopoly 
(case with FDI), and the intermediate goods sector is represented by a monopoly. In this 
model the coming of multinational corporations to the final goods market of the host 
economy causes two opposite effects. On the one hand, foreign firms create a demand 
for intermediate goods, which causes the supply provided by local suppliers to grow 
(positive demand effect). On the other hand, by crowding local competitors out of the 
final goods market, multinationals reduce the demand for intermediate goods on the side 
of local firms – this leads to decrease in supply of intermediate goods (negative demand 
effect). The authors argue that that the size of the FDI linkage effects significantly 
depends on the technological gap between multinational corporations and local 
producers. This gap is measured as a negative difference between the amount of 
intermediate goods that the foreign company needs  in order to produce one unit of final 
goods versus the same amount for the local firm. 
In this paper we extend the Lin/Saggi (2003) model by analyzing linkage effects 
in the cases of perfect competition and vertically integrated domestic company in the 
intermediate goods market. Our analysis shows that the coming of foreign companies to 
the final goods sector provides positive “consumer-supplier” linkage effects. Although 
this result doesn’t depend on the market structure in the final goods sector, the structure 
significantly affects the size of FDI linkage effects – the more competitive the 
intermediate goods sector is, the larger the linkage effects are. They reach their 
maximum under perfect competition in the intermediate goods market, minimum –   6
under monopoly in this sector, and medium size - when a vertically integrated local firm 
exists in the market. We have also discovered that a more competitive market structure 
per se doesn’t guarantee larger positive effects of FDI. It is important that in addition to 
this competitive structure local firms do not significantly lag behind foreign firms in 
their technological level. 
The paper has the following structure. In the second section a basic model of 
FDI linkage effects where the intermediate goods sector is characterized by a pure 
monopoly (Lin/Saggi model) is presented. In the third and fourth sections we analyze 
the cases of perfect competition and vertically integrated domestic company in the 
intermediate goods market. Comparative analysis of the size of FDI linkage effects for 
the aforementioned market structures is also given in these sections. The main findings 
and results are presented in the conclusion. 
 
2. FDI linkage effects under monopoly in the intermediate goods 
market (basic model) 
Basic assumptions 
The host economy has three sectors: the first two (x and y) produce final goods, 
the third (z) – intermediate goods. All the produced goods are consumed within the 
domestic economy. 
Two resources are used in the production of final goods – labor and intermediate 
product z, which serves as a resource for production of x. In the production of y only 
one resource is used – labor. Y is used in the economy for measuring product. 
Production of y is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect competition in 
the market. 
Under conditions of an open economy, two firms are operating in the sector 
producing  x. They are competing according to the Cournot model: the local firm 
(denoted with h) and the multinational corporation (denoted with m). Under conditions 
of closed economy, the product x is produced by a domestic monopolist (firm h). For 
the production of one unit of x the foreign firm uses λm units of labor and µm units of 
intermediate product z. Accordingly, the local firm uses λh units of labor and µh units of 
z. It is assumed that the foreign firm possesses a more advanced technology as   7
compared to the local firm. This means that λm ≤ λh  and µm ≤ µh. The marginal costs of a 
firm producing х equal:  
 
ci = λi*1 + µi*w,          ( 1 )    
 
where w is the price of intermediate product z. 
Intermediate product z is produced by a domestic monopolist – the sole firm in 
the sector. Only labor (r units for every unit of intermediate product) is used in the 
production of z. 
The model assumes that the multinational corporation buys at least a share of 
intermediate product it needs within the host country. In most cases it is true, since even 
if the foreign firm buys all the material from abroad, there exists a number of products 
that can’t be imported (e.g. banking and communications services), so the firm has to 
buy them within the host country. The bigger part of intermediate goods the 
multinational corporation buys within the country, the larger is the vertical FDI effect in 
the host economy. 
Profit functions of firms in the x sector are represented by an equation: 
 
πi (qi, qj)= (p (qi,+ qj) – ci)*qi        (2) 
 
where  i, j = h or m; p (qi+qj) – inverse function of demand for х; ci – marginal 
costs of the firm i; qi – sales volume (output) of the firm i.  
The model assumes that the demand for х has a linear character: 
 
 p (qi,+ qj) = α - qi - qj. 
 
Two states of the domestic economy are analyzed in the model: the case of the 
closed economy (autarky) and the case of open economy with FDI. For each state of the 
economy we determine the degree of backward linkage, which is measured in the model 
as volume of demand for intermediate goods from the side of the  goods producers. If 
the volume of demand for intermediate product in the case of open economy turns out to   8
be larger than in the case of closed economy, we can draw a conclusion that FDI causes 
positive linkage effects. 
It should be noted that we use the notion of “positive FDI linkage effects” only 
by convention, as the volume of demand for intermediate product per se is positive in 
any case – both in closed and in open economies. By using the notion of positive FDI 
linkage effects we merely emphasize the fact that with the coming of the foreign firm 
the demand for intermediate goods in the host economy increases, which positively 
affects the sector that produces them. 
The usage of volume of demand for intermediate product as a measure of the 
backward FDI linkage effect appears to be adequate in the context of this model. First, 
there are no foreign suppliers in the intermediate goods market, and all the volume of 
demand is supplied by domestic producers. Second, volume of demand is a sufficiently 
simple integral index of mutual influence that the sectors exert upon each other in the 
vertical technological chain – on the basis of this index we can analyze changes in 
profitability and productivity of firms in the intermediate goods market. 
 
The case of the closed economy 
Under autarky product х is produced by a sole domestic producer. According to 
the condition of profit maximization for monopoly, optimum output of the local 
producer and then the demand for intermediate product from the side of the final goods 
sector equal: 
 
The producer of intermediate goods, being a monopolist, maximizes its profit: 
 πs
A (w) = (w – r)µhqh
A(w). 
 
We can find from the intermediate goods producer’s profit function the first 
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On the next step we find the output of the intermediate goods producer in the 
closed economy (3): 
 
Since, as we have indicated earlier, the size of the backward linkage effect is 
measured in the model as the volume of demand for intermediate product from the side 
of the final goods producer, expression (3) describes the size of this effect in the closed 
economy. We will use for this value parameter b
A. 
As we see from the formula (3), in this model the size of the backward linkage 
effect in the closed economy positively depends on the market size α, negatively 
depends on the amount of labor r used for production of one unit of the intermediate 
product, and negatively depends on the amount of labor λh used by the local producer. 
These dependences are easy to interpret. Indeed, no matter what type of market 
structure we have, with the growth of the final goods market’s size its optimum output 
also grows, which leads to an increase in demand for intermediate goods. In the context 
of our model this means that the size of the backward linkage effect increases. Negative 
dependence on the amount of labor used for one unit of intermediate product can be 
explained by the fact that with the growth of r the costs of producing intermediate goods 
rise, which causes the demand for them to fall – the size of the backward linkage effect 
decreases. Other things being equal, the growth of the amount of labor λh used by the 
local final goods producer leads to increase of costs and reduces the optimum output. 
The latter results in the decrease in demand for resources, which, given our 
assumptions, causes the size of the backward linkage effect to diminish. 
The influence of the share of intermediate product used in the production of х on 
the size of linkage effects is ambiguous. This influence is positive if the following 
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It should be noted that under reasonable assumptions about the parameters of 
demand and costs, the condition (4) holds always, since the parameter of the demand 
function α should substantially exceed the size of costs (the right-hand member of the 
inequality is very close by size to marginal costs) in order to ensure optimum volume of 
output in the market. Economic interpretation of the positive dependence of the linkage 
effects’ size on the share of intermediate product used in production seems obvious. If 
the share of intermediate product in the cost structure of the final goods production 
rises, the demand for intermediate goods also increases, which means under our 
assumptions that the size of the backward linkage effect increases. 
 
The case of the open economy with FDI 
Similarly in the case of the closed economy, the size of the backward linkage 
effect in open economy with FDI is determined by the volume of demand for 
intermediate goods from the side of the final goods sector. The specific character of this 
situation lies in the fact that the demand for intermediate goods is formed not only by 
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Since the profit functions of the local firm (goods producer) and the 
multinational corporation are determined by the equation (2), we can find the output of 
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For the subsequent analysis we need to find the price of the intermediate product 
that is formed in an open economy. We do it by maximizing the profit function of 
intermediate goods producer: πs
F (w) = (w – r)qs
F(w).     
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Now, when we have found all the parameters that determine the size of the 
linkage effect in the open economy with FDI (b
F), we can compare it with the 
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 hence 
[] [] h m mon
A
mon
F b b µ µ > ⇔ > 2        ( 7 )  
   
Strictly speaking, the positive sign of the expression (6) is determined not only 
by the condition from (7), but also by the positive sign of the second multiplier in the 
numerator of the expression (6). The latter holds under common assumptions about 
parameters of demand and costs functions – we have discussed it earlier. 
We can derive an important conclusion from the last inequation: FDI leads to the 
positive backward linkage effects only if the technical gap between foreign and local 
final goods producers is not too big. 
If, on the contrary, the technology used for final goods production at the 
multinational corporation substantially surpasses the one used at the local firm, two 
results occur. First, the market share of the domestic final goods producer sharply 
declines (negative effect of competition), which decreases the volume of demand for 
intermediate goods from the side of the local firm. Second, other things being equal, the 
foreign firm buys smaller amount of intermediate goods for the production of x 
(negative demand effect). These factors lead to a decrease in the output of the local 
intermediate goods producer in the open economy, which causes negative backward 
FDI linkage effects.   12
The size of FDI linkage effects is substantially affected by the size of the market 
α: the bigger α is, the bigger is the value (b
F-b
A). This dependency is easy to interpret. 
Indeed, if the final goods market size grows, the demand for intermediate goods also 
increases. Moreover, under the conditions of a growing market, the level of competition 
between the foreign and domestic producers falls, which results in lesser negative 
horizontal effects of competition.  
 
3.  FDI linkage effects under competition in the intermediate goods 
market 
In this section we consider the situation when the intermediate goods sector is 
characterized not by monopoly, but by perfect competition. We analyze linkage effects 
in the closed economy and in the open economy (when multinational corporations 
operate in the final goods sector). 
 
The case of the closed economy 
When there is perfect competition in the intermediate goods market, the price of 
intermediate product z is equal to the marginal costs of its production: w =MCs = r. 
In autarky equilibrium the local firm maximizes its profit in the final goods 
market: 
πh
A (w) = (p(qh) - λh - µhw) qh. 
Since w=r, then: 
[] ) ( 2
1 r q h h comp
A
h µ λ α − − = . 
The size of linkage effects is determined by the following expression: 
 
  [] ) ( 2
1 r q b h h h
A
h h comp
A µ λ α µ µ − − = ≡      ( 8 )  
  
As in the basic model, the size of linkage effects is affected by: market size 
(positively), share of labor in the final goods production (negatively), price of 
intermediate product (negatively). Influence of the share of intermediate product used in 
the production of х on the size of linkage effects is ambiguous. This influence is   13
positive if the following condition holds (it is identical to the one given above for the 
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The case of the open economy with FDI 
The profit functions of the local and foreign firms are derived by analogy with 
the general profit function (2) in the basic model. In order to determine equilibrium 
outputs we formulate the first order conditions for these functions and solve the 
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In the case of two firms in the final goods market, the size of linkage effects is 
determined by the expression (5), though now w
F = r.    
We can compare the sizes of linkage effects in autarky and in open economy 
with FDI: 
 
  [] )) 2 ( 2 )( 2 ( 6
1
h m m h h m mon
A F r b b µ µ λ λ α µ µ − − − + − = −  (9) 
 
The right-hand member in parentheses of the expression (10) is exactly equal to 
the numerator of the purchase amount of the intermediate product by the foreign 
company in the host country -  ) (w q
F
m , which should have a positive sign. Accordingly,  
 
[ ] h m mon
A F b b µ µ > ⇔ > − 2 0.  
 
The latter condition is similar to the condition (7) for the case of monopoly in 
the intermediate goods market, and it reflects the fact that under perfect competition the   14
backward FDI linkage effects are positive if and only if the technological gap between 
the foreign and local companies is not too big.  
  Now we can compare the sizes of FDI linkage effects for the types of 
intermediate goods market structure we considered – to be exact, perfect competition 
and monopoly. Using the values of equilibrium volumes of demand for intermediate 
product from the side of various types of firms and, correspondingly, the sizes of FDI 
linkage effects under perfect competition and monopoly (expression (5)), we can 
calculate the difference between the latter two (expression (10)). 
 
  0 ) )( ( 3
2 ) ( ) (
2 2 > + − − = − m m h h comp mon mon
F
comp
F w w b b µ µ µ µ    (10) 
 
The expression (10) is positive until the intermediate goods price under 
monopoly exceeds the corresponding price under perfect competition. Since the 
monopolist fixes the price for its production on a level that is higher than marginal 
costs, the expression (10) has a positive sign. Thus, the size of FDI linkage effects is 
larger when there is perfect competition in the intermediate goods market instead of 
monopoly. It should be noted that the sign of the expression (10) doesn’t depend on 
relative levels of µm and  µh, so it isn’t connected to the size of the technological gap 
between the foreign and domestic companies. 
The result we obtained, of course, isn’t unexpected. Indeed, since in our model 
the size of linkage effects is determined by the volume of demand for intermediate 
product from the side of the final goods sector and the demand is essentially determined 
by the price, then the growth of prices under monopoly inevitably restricts the demand 
from the side of the final goods sector. This limits the opportunity to benefit from 
positive FDI linkage effects. The size of the backward linkage effects is larger if the 
intermediate goods market is relatively more competitive. 
This statement needs to be verified for the case of vertically integrated markets. 
 
4.  FDI linkage effects under vertical integration 
Let’s suppose that there is a vertically integrated domestic firm in the host 
economy. This firm buys intermediate goods for its needs in its own subdivision 
without any extra monopoly charge, i.e. at the perfect competition price, which is equal   15
to marginal costs of production. Under open economy, multinational corporation – 
another competitor in the final goods market – has to buy intermediate goods at the 
monopoly price from the sole domestic seller (the subdivision of the vertically 
integrated domestic company). 
We now move on to analyze linkage effects for the case of open economy with 
FDI in the final goods sector. 
 
The case of the closed economy 
The case of vertical integration under closed economy is similar to the case of 
perfect competition in the intermediate goods market, since the intermediate product 
price, which is equal to marginal costs of its production, is also an internal transfer price 
of the vertically integrated domestic firm – this condition holds if the intermediate 
goods market is perfectly competitive. The size of the vertical linkage effects is 
determined by the expression (8). 
 
The case of the open economy with FDI 
Profit functions of the local and foreign firms are derived by analogy with the 
general profit function (2) in the basic model. The vertically integrated firm buys 
intermediate product at the price equal to the marginal costs of its production: w = r; 
and the foreign firm buys intermediate product which price is fixed in the monopoly 
market: w = wv. In order to determine equilibrium outputs we formulate the first order 
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The size of backward linkage effects is determined by the expression (5), where 
w
F
h = r and w
F
m = wv. By substituting the obtained equilibrium volumes of demand for 
intermediate product from the side of two firms to the expression (5), we can compare 
the sizes of linkage effects under autarky and open economy with FDI: 
   16
[] ) ( 3
1 ) 2 )( 2 ( 6
1
m h v m m h h m vi
A F w r b b µ µ µ λ λ α µ µ + + + + + − = − . 
 
Since all the parameters of this expression are positive, then, as in cases of other 
types of market structure, under a vertically integrated domestic company the condition 
for existence of positive FDI linkage effects goes as follows: the technological gap 
between the foreign and domestic firms isn’t too big, i.e.: 
 
[ ] h m vi
A F b b µ µ > ⇔ > − 2 0 . 
 
By analogy with the previous section, we can compare the size of FDI linkage 
effects under vertical integration with the corresponding sizes under other types of 
market structure we have analyzed – monopoly and perfect competition. Using the 
values we have obtained – equilibrium volumes of demand for intermediate goods from 
the side of various types of firms and sizes of FDI linkage effects under perfect 
competition, monopoly and vertical integration (expression (5)) – let’s calculate the 
difference between them. 
  Expression (11) describes the difference between the sizes of FDI linkage effects 
under vertical integration and monopoly. 
 
) 2 )( ( 3
1 ) 2 )( ( 3
1 ) ( ) ( h m v m m m h m h mon
F
vi
F w w r w b b µ µ µ µ µ µ − − + − − = −  (11)   
 
Since µh > µm from the assumptions of the model, the sufficient condition for the 
sign of the expression (11) to be positive is fulfillment of the two following conditions: 
h m µ µ > 2 and wm > wv > r. The first condition is a standard condition of a positive sign 
of FDI linkage effects in the context of this model, and it reflects the fact that foreign 
firms shouldn’t be “too advanced” or else they crowd domestic firms out and thus limit 
the sources of demand for intermediate goods. As for the second condition, we can 
easily show that it holds. Indeed, as  wcomp=r, and the monopolist in the intermediate 
goods sector gets a positive profit, then wm > wcomp  и wv > wcomp. Now let’s compare wm 
and wv. In case of monopoly in the intermediate goods market and oligopoly in the final 
goods market, the demand for intermediate product is created by both the domestic firm   17
and multinational corporation. If the domestic firm is a vertically integrated structure 
and gets intermediate product at the internal transfer price, then the demand for 
intermediate goods is created only by the foreign firm. Of course, the price of the 
product is higher in the first case, since the market is more monopolized and its size 
(residual demand for the monopolist) is relatively bigger: wm > wv. Hence it is true that: 
wm > wv > wcomp. This means that under a vertically integrated domestic firm the FDI 
linkage effects are larger than under monopoly in the intermediate goods market. 
We can compare the corresponding sizes of linkage effects under vertical 
integration and perfect competition in the intermediate goods market. The expression 
(12) determines the difference between the sizes of FDI linkage effects under vertical 
integration and perfect competition. 
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From (12) it follows that FDI provides larger positive linkage effects under 
perfect competition in the final goods market as compared to the case of the vertically 
integrated firm, if two conditions hold. First, the price of intermediate product under 
vertical integration should be higher than the price in the competitive market, which is 
always true. Second, the technological gap between the foreign and domestic firms is 
not too big. We used the latter condition when we analyzed positive FDI effects in 
comparison with closed economy, but now it becomes particularly important – not only 
sufficient, but also necessary. 
Economic interpretation of this condition goes as follows. In the situation when 
the domestic firm is vertically integrated, it has a broader “margin of safety” in a 
competitive struggle with the foreign firm as compared to the situation without such 
integration. For the domestic company, existence of a big technological gap doesn’t 
create any real threat of losing a substantial market share and thus reducing of demand 
for intermediate product. It’s quite another matter when the intermediate goods market 
is perfectly competitive. Then, in the case of a big technological gap the domestic firm 
can lose a considerable market share and in that way cut its demand for intermediate   18
product. It is exactly because of this circumstance that positive FDI linkage effects are 
larger under perfect competition as compared to the situation with vertical integration if 
and only if the technological gap isn’t too big. 
The results we obtained allow us to prove the main finding of our work – the 
structure of the intermediate goods market is an important factor of FDI linkage effects. 
The largest positive FDI backward linkage effects occur under perfect competition in 
the intermediate goods sector, middle-sized – under vertical integration, and the 
smallest – under monopoly: 
 






comp b b b . 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper is devoted to an analysis of how different types of market structure in 
the host economy affect the size of FDI backward linkage effects. It is based on the 
assumptions of the Lin/Saggi (2003) model. 
We extend this model by examining cases of perfect competition and vertically 
integrated domestic company in the intermediate goods market. We clarify the 
following issues. First, how FDI affects the size of backward linkage effects in the host 
economy (comparing the case of a closed economy to the case of an open economy with 
FDI, given that the market structure in the intermediate goods sector is fixed). Second, 
what market structure in the intermediate goods sector provides maximum FDI linkage 
effects in an open economy. We arrive at the following conclusions. 
No matter what market structure exists in the intermediate goods sector, FDI 
leads to positive backward linkage effects, but only if the technological gap between the 
foreign and local firms isn’t too big. When the gap is sufficiently big, domestic firms 
are crowded out of the market by foreign firms, and FDI linkage effects can become 
negative. The sources of these negative signs can be the following: the negative effect 
of competition (reduction of demand for intermediate product because the domestic 
companies are crowded out) and the negative demand effect (relatively smaller demand 
for the intermediate product from the side of the foreign firms as compared to the local 
ones).   19
Foreign direct investment causes positive linkage effects under any type of 
market structure in the intermediate goods sector. However, these effects have different 
sizes. They reach their maximum under perfect competition in the intermediate goods 
market, minimum – under monopoly in this sector, and medium size - when a vertically 
integrated local firm exists in the market. Under vertical integration the size of linkage 
effects is larger than under monopoly, but smaller than under perfect competition. Thus, 
the market structure is one of the important factors of FDI linkage effects. 
We have also discovered that a more competitive market structure per se doesn’t 
guarantee larger positive effects of FDI. It is important that in addition to this 
competitive structure local firms do not significantly lag behind foreign firms in their 
technological level. If such a technological gap exists, vertical integration in the 
intermediate goods market can provide larger positive FDI linkage effects, as compared 
to the case of perfect competition. 
The latter conclusion can be considered as one of the possible applications of the 
theory of second-best policy. According to this theory, when there is any distortion (in 
our case – a substantial technological gap between the companies) in the market, 
introduction of an additional distortion (vertical integration instead of perfect 
competition) can lead to an increase in the welfare of economic agents. 
These conclusions have an evident application for determining industrial and 
anti-trust policies in the modern economy of Russia. Government policy aimed at 
fostering positive foreign direct investment effects in the Russian economy should 
consist not only of instruments encouraging competition and restricting monopoly, but 
also of instruments promoting more rapid diffusion of up-to-date technologies and 
technical re-equipment of Russian firms. In isolation from one another, these policy 
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